L'Europe pour laquelle vous ne votez pas
Statewatch publie une analyse du rapport de l'Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy ("The Future Group").
Qu'est-ce que le Future Group ?
"At the informal meeting of Ministers of Interior and Immigration in Dresden in January 2007, the German Minister of the Interior and the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security proposed the creation of an informal Group at ministerial level with the objective to consider the future of the European area of justice, freedom and security. The findings and recommendations of the Future Group are meant to be an important contribution and a source of inspiration for the European Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual programme in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The Future Group was co-chaired by the Vice President of the European Commission and the Minister of Interior of the acting Presidency. It brought together, ad personam, the Ministers of Interior of the two current trios of Presidencies (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia; France, Czech Republic, Sweden) and a representative of the future Presidency trio, i.e. Spain, Belgium and Hungary." (mon emphase)
Dans son rapport, le groupe élabore des propositions pour les cinq années à venir (2009-2014). L'analyse de Statewatch :
"It may be pure chance that there are only five references in the report to the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and thirteen to the "area of European Home Affairs". Certainly the sub-title of "Freedom, Security and Privacy" suggests a new – and, on examination, tokenistic notion of privacy.Noticeable too is the shift from references to "law enforcement agencies" (LEAs) as requiring this or that power to "public security organisations" including LEAs but not limited to them. This is a logical shift now that internal-external-security-nexus is explicitly the dominant concept, ie: strengthening the powers of all security agencies, not just those dealing with terrorism and serious crime."
Mais ça va être soumis au vote tout ça non ? Mais oui bien sûr...
"In October 1999 the Council (EU governments) adopted the "Tampere programme" covering the whole of justice and home affairs for the period 1999-2004.9 The final text, adopted on 16 October 1999, was not available until the morning of that day and was adopted a few hours later. There was no involvement of national or European parliaments in drafting the text, nor could civil society discuss and comment." It has emerged that the key players were Charles Elsen then acting Director General in the Council Secretariat for JHA aided by the late Adrian Fortescue who headed a JHA "Task Force" in the Commission. An article by Elsen, for the Academy of European Law (Trier): says extraordinarily that: "it was decided to involve the working groups and the Justice and Home Affairs Council in this work as little as possible". He says this was because they did not want "technical ministers" (ie: Interior/Home Ministers and Justice Ministers) involved as: "Heads of government are capable of demonstrating more ambition than experts" - and heads of government, not being experts, would be dependant on Elsen who took part in the Finnish PM’s "tour" and "participated actively in the preparations". The "Hague programme" was also negotiated in secret meetings, a text was available a couple of weeks before it was adopted on 5 November 2004 as an "A" point - simply nodded through - at the European Council (meetings of Prime Ministers). Again there was no time for any democratic input."
Ce qui a déjà été fait :
"To appreciate what is "new" in the Future group report a quick resume of what is already in the pipeline or planned is necessary. In 2006 a Directive on the mandatory retention of all communications data across the EU was adopted. Service providers are obliged to keep and give agencies access to records of all phone-calls, mobile phone calls (and their location), faxes, e-mails and internet usage. This year most EU states that had not done so are implementing this at national level. In short, records of all communications by everyone in the EU are held and can be accessed by agencies in connection with “serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law” which varies from member states to member state or for suspicion of a “serious crime”. [...] In 2004 a Regulation on EU passports required the taking of fingerprints (biometrics) from all applying for one. Again there was a time-lag in the implementation at national level. But from 2009 onwards millions of people across the EU will have to attend special centres to be interviewed (to prove who they are) then compulsorily finger-printed.[...] EU laws on driving licences have been harmonised so that licences have to be renewed initially every 10 years with the option for every five years - in the UK a driving licence is held from passing the test until the age of 70 (when it can be renewed with a doctor's letter). Renewing the licence every 10 years will mean the "chip" and the data on it can be updated and adapted. [...] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is to be upgraded to hold more categories of data (including fingerprints and DNA), access to all the data is to be extended to all agencies(police, immigration and customs).13 SIS II is to share a “common technical platform” with VIS (Visa Information System) for the policing of visitors – thus SIS II/VIS will become a dedicated surveillance tool"
(Pour en apprendre plus sur le traité de Lisbonne, une autre analyse, pour le moins édifiante, par ici).
Demandez le programme
"Commission Vice-President Frattini told the meeting [...] "a new balance between the right to security and the protection of fundamental rights... There is a need to overcome the traditional dogma of seeing collective security and individual freedom as two opposed concepts which exclude each other. Individual rights can only flourish in an atmosphere of collective security". To which one can respond that if "collective security" demands the surveillance of all movements and all telecommunications and the collection of all the fingerprints of everyone living in the EU there can be no individual freedom, except that sanctioned by the state. "Freedom" is not just about rights it is also the freedom "from" state surveillance and control. Put another way, if "collective security" requires the state, in "the name of all", to set the limits, boundaries and sanctions of all our actions it is a recipe not for "freedom" but enslavement."
"Upcoming" priorities Frattini said included: "the wider use of phone-tapping and CCTV" and a "multilateral legal initiative for a new definition of terrorism" on which talks had been started with the USA and Russia - this is reference to the blocked discussions in the UN where the EU and USA amongst others refuse to include any reference to "state terrorism"." (Mon emphase)
""Preserving Internal Security and External Stability" Under this concept there are both refinements of existing developments and new proposals. Its starts with [...] standardised equipment to ensure interoperability and technological abilities including: "video surveillance, Internet telephony and police use of unpiloted aircraft" plus collective licensing costs of agreed equipment, computer and translation programmes [...] this could be fulfilled by: "means of creating automated data transfer instruments""
L'ami américain :
"By 2014 the European Union should also make up its mind with regard to the political objective of achieving a Euro-Atlantic area of cooperation with the USA in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice". Joie...
Toujours plus vite
"The "E-Border" concept for checks and controls in the integrated Border Management Strategy needs the following: - a registered travellers programme, ie: pre-registering with "iris scans" and fingerprints to allow speedy clearance;
- a Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA) following on exactly from the US model. Permission to travel (watch-list checks) has to be given before buying a ticket. This is presumably for travel into the EU. Although it should be noted that the planned EU-PNR system may end up recording the travel of everyone in and out of the EU, within the EU and within each country by air, land and sea"
Comme c'est pratique !
Toujours plus loin avec les propositions faites par le Portugal :
"“potential information for use in the day-to-day operations of public security organisations.One obvious illustration is the ability to track the location of any active mobilephone (and to know where it was last switched off and last switched on). Thisis just the beginning. In the next few years billions of items in the physicalworld will be connected, using technologies such as radio-frequency identification (RFID), broadband wireless (WiFi, WiMAX), satellite and wireless (Bluetooth, wireless USB, ZigBee). This means it will be possible to trace more and more objects in real-time and to analyse their movement and activity retrospectively.... In the near future most objects will generate streams of digital data about their location and use - revealing patterns and social behaviours which public security professionals can use to prevent or investigate incidents.” [...] Social networks such as My Space, Face Book and Second Life - and indeed all forms of online activity - generate huge amounts of information that can be of use to public security organisations. [...] This paper and the final report were drawn up by high-level officials and agreed by EU Ministers."
Le rapport n'oublie pas de préciser que :
"the Future group refers to existing police cooperation procedures, that is, national laws, being "extremely constraining" and that they should be "more flexible""
N'oublions pas les enfants :
"There is an assumption, on this and wider issues in the EU, is that “if it is technologically possible why should it not be introduced?” This brings to mind the discussion in the EU over the age at which children should be subjected to finger-printed for passports, visas or ID cards. The discussion in the working parties of the Council of the European Union (the governments) have been based not on moral questions but rather at what age is it technologically possible to collect accurate fingerprints – most want this to be from six years old and upwards, some even want to collect them at birth."
Statewatch publie une analyse du rapport de l'Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy ("The Future Group").
Qu'est-ce que le Future Group ?
"At the informal meeting of Ministers of Interior and Immigration in Dresden in January 2007, the German Minister of the Interior and the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security proposed the creation of an informal Group at ministerial level with the objective to consider the future of the European area of justice, freedom and security. The findings and recommendations of the Future Group are meant to be an important contribution and a source of inspiration for the European Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual programme in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The Future Group was co-chaired by the Vice President of the European Commission and the Minister of Interior of the acting Presidency. It brought together, ad personam, the Ministers of Interior of the two current trios of Presidencies (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia; France, Czech Republic, Sweden) and a representative of the future Presidency trio, i.e. Spain, Belgium and Hungary." (mon emphase)
Dans son rapport, le groupe élabore des propositions pour les cinq années à venir (2009-2014). L'analyse de Statewatch :
"It may be pure chance that there are only five references in the report to the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and thirteen to the "area of European Home Affairs". Certainly the sub-title of "Freedom, Security and Privacy" suggests a new – and, on examination, tokenistic notion of privacy.Noticeable too is the shift from references to "law enforcement agencies" (LEAs) as requiring this or that power to "public security organisations" including LEAs but not limited to them. This is a logical shift now that internal-external-security-nexus is explicitly the dominant concept, ie: strengthening the powers of all security agencies, not just those dealing with terrorism and serious crime."
Mais ça va être soumis au vote tout ça non ? Mais oui bien sûr...
"In October 1999 the Council (EU governments) adopted the "Tampere programme" covering the whole of justice and home affairs for the period 1999-2004.9 The final text, adopted on 16 October 1999, was not available until the morning of that day and was adopted a few hours later. There was no involvement of national or European parliaments in drafting the text, nor could civil society discuss and comment." It has emerged that the key players were Charles Elsen then acting Director General in the Council Secretariat for JHA aided by the late Adrian Fortescue who headed a JHA "Task Force" in the Commission. An article by Elsen, for the Academy of European Law (Trier): says extraordinarily that: "it was decided to involve the working groups and the Justice and Home Affairs Council in this work as little as possible". He says this was because they did not want "technical ministers" (ie: Interior/Home Ministers and Justice Ministers) involved as: "Heads of government are capable of demonstrating more ambition than experts" - and heads of government, not being experts, would be dependant on Elsen who took part in the Finnish PM’s "tour" and "participated actively in the preparations". The "Hague programme" was also negotiated in secret meetings, a text was available a couple of weeks before it was adopted on 5 November 2004 as an "A" point - simply nodded through - at the European Council (meetings of Prime Ministers). Again there was no time for any democratic input."
Ce qui a déjà été fait :
"To appreciate what is "new" in the Future group report a quick resume of what is already in the pipeline or planned is necessary. In 2006 a Directive on the mandatory retention of all communications data across the EU was adopted. Service providers are obliged to keep and give agencies access to records of all phone-calls, mobile phone calls (and their location), faxes, e-mails and internet usage. This year most EU states that had not done so are implementing this at national level. In short, records of all communications by everyone in the EU are held and can be accessed by agencies in connection with “serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law” which varies from member states to member state or for suspicion of a “serious crime”. [...] In 2004 a Regulation on EU passports required the taking of fingerprints (biometrics) from all applying for one. Again there was a time-lag in the implementation at national level. But from 2009 onwards millions of people across the EU will have to attend special centres to be interviewed (to prove who they are) then compulsorily finger-printed.[...] EU laws on driving licences have been harmonised so that licences have to be renewed initially every 10 years with the option for every five years - in the UK a driving licence is held from passing the test until the age of 70 (when it can be renewed with a doctor's letter). Renewing the licence every 10 years will mean the "chip" and the data on it can be updated and adapted. [...] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is to be upgraded to hold more categories of data (including fingerprints and DNA), access to all the data is to be extended to all agencies(police, immigration and customs).13 SIS II is to share a “common technical platform” with VIS (Visa Information System) for the policing of visitors – thus SIS II/VIS will become a dedicated surveillance tool"
(Pour en apprendre plus sur le traité de Lisbonne, une autre analyse, pour le moins édifiante, par ici).
Demandez le programme
"Commission Vice-President Frattini told the meeting [...] "a new balance between the right to security and the protection of fundamental rights... There is a need to overcome the traditional dogma of seeing collective security and individual freedom as two opposed concepts which exclude each other. Individual rights can only flourish in an atmosphere of collective security". To which one can respond that if "collective security" demands the surveillance of all movements and all telecommunications and the collection of all the fingerprints of everyone living in the EU there can be no individual freedom, except that sanctioned by the state. "Freedom" is not just about rights it is also the freedom "from" state surveillance and control. Put another way, if "collective security" requires the state, in "the name of all", to set the limits, boundaries and sanctions of all our actions it is a recipe not for "freedom" but enslavement."
"Upcoming" priorities Frattini said included: "the wider use of phone-tapping and CCTV" and a "multilateral legal initiative for a new definition of terrorism" on which talks had been started with the USA and Russia - this is reference to the blocked discussions in the UN where the EU and USA amongst others refuse to include any reference to "state terrorism"." (Mon emphase)
""Preserving Internal Security and External Stability" Under this concept there are both refinements of existing developments and new proposals. Its starts with [...] standardised equipment to ensure interoperability and technological abilities including: "video surveillance, Internet telephony and police use of unpiloted aircraft" plus collective licensing costs of agreed equipment, computer and translation programmes [...] this could be fulfilled by: "means of creating automated data transfer instruments""
L'ami américain :
"By 2014 the European Union should also make up its mind with regard to the political objective of achieving a Euro-Atlantic area of cooperation with the USA in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice". Joie...
Toujours plus vite
"The "E-Border" concept for checks and controls in the integrated Border Management Strategy needs the following: - a registered travellers programme, ie: pre-registering with "iris scans" and fingerprints to allow speedy clearance;
- a Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA) following on exactly from the US model. Permission to travel (watch-list checks) has to be given before buying a ticket. This is presumably for travel into the EU. Although it should be noted that the planned EU-PNR system may end up recording the travel of everyone in and out of the EU, within the EU and within each country by air, land and sea"
Comme c'est pratique !
Toujours plus loin avec les propositions faites par le Portugal :
"“potential information for use in the day-to-day operations of public security organisations.One obvious illustration is the ability to track the location of any active mobilephone (and to know where it was last switched off and last switched on). Thisis just the beginning. In the next few years billions of items in the physicalworld will be connected, using technologies such as radio-frequency identification (RFID), broadband wireless (WiFi, WiMAX), satellite and wireless (Bluetooth, wireless USB, ZigBee). This means it will be possible to trace more and more objects in real-time and to analyse their movement and activity retrospectively.... In the near future most objects will generate streams of digital data about their location and use - revealing patterns and social behaviours which public security professionals can use to prevent or investigate incidents.” [...] Social networks such as My Space, Face Book and Second Life - and indeed all forms of online activity - generate huge amounts of information that can be of use to public security organisations. [...] This paper and the final report were drawn up by high-level officials and agreed by EU Ministers."
Le rapport n'oublie pas de préciser que :
"the Future group refers to existing police cooperation procedures, that is, national laws, being "extremely constraining" and that they should be "more flexible""
N'oublions pas les enfants :
"There is an assumption, on this and wider issues in the EU, is that “if it is technologically possible why should it not be introduced?” This brings to mind the discussion in the EU over the age at which children should be subjected to finger-printed for passports, visas or ID cards. The discussion in the working parties of the Council of the European Union (the governments) have been based not on moral questions but rather at what age is it technologically possible to collect accurate fingerprints – most want this to be from six years old and upwards, some even want to collect them at birth."
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